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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The system of means-tested transfers in the U.S. has evolved in impor-
tant ways over the last decade, with significant expansions of Medic-
aid, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Supplemental Security
Income program, and with significant contraction in Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, now titled the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families program. To determine where we are in our under-
standing of each of these programs, as well as the other majorpro-
grams in the system of means-tested transfers, a volume is under prepa-
ration by the National Bureau of Economic Research that surveys the
current structure and historical evolution of each of these programs and
that synthesizes the results of the research that has been conducted
on their economic effects. In addition to the AFDCTANF, Medicaid,
EITC, and SSI programs, reviews have been conducted for the Food
Stamp program and for housing, child care, job training, and child
support programs. This paper summarizes the results of those reviews
and highlights the large number of important findings from existing
research.
The author would like to thank the Smith-Richardson Foundation for support for the
conference and NBER volume upon which this paper is based. Comments from Robert
LaLonde, Edgar Olson, and Karl Scholz are appreciated.2Moffitt
Reform of the system of means-tested transfers in the U.S. continues
to be an important topic for public policy as well as an area of continued
research by economists. Policy and research interest have been kept
particularly high by significant transformations in the means-tested
transfer system over the last decade. The most important structural
changes have taken place in three programs. One is the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) programnow named the Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)programwhose generosity
has been significantly reduced and whose eligibility conditions have
been restricted to those who can and are willing to comply with work
requirements and other new rules. A second is the Medicaid program,
which has been significantly expanded to cover more families and chil-
dren off the AFDC-TANF program. The third is the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), whose benefits have greatly expanded and whose expen-
ditures now exceed those in the traditional AFDC-TANF program. A
fourth program which has undergone significant expenditure and
caseload expansion, although without major structural change, is the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
To determine where we stand in our understanding of each of these
programs, as well as the other major programs in the systemof means-
tested transfers, a volume is under preparation by the National Bureau
of Economic Research that surveys the current structure and historical
evolution of each of these programs and that synthesizes the results of
the research that has been conducted on their economic effects (Moffitt,
forthcoming). In addition to the AFDC-TANF, Medicaid, EITC, and SSI
programs, reviews have been conducted for the Food Stamp program
and for housing, child care, job training, and child support programs.
This paper summarizes the results of those reviews.
The paper first provides a brief background discussion of trends in
expenditures on means-tested transfers as a whole. It then goes on to
discuss each of the major programs individually.
1. OVERALL TRENDS IN EXPENDITURES IN
MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS
Figure 1 shows trends since 1968 in per capita expenditures in the eighty
largest means-tested transfer programs in the country. The figure re-
veals that there have been four phases of spending growth: an expan-
sionary phase beginning in the 1960s and running through the early or
mid-1970s, a contractionary (or stationary) phase beginning in the mid-
1970s and running until the mid-1980s, another expansionary phaseFIGURE 1. Real Per Capita Expenditures on Means-Tested Transfers,
1968-1998
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Sources: Burke (1999, Tables 4 and 5), U.S. Dept. of Commerce (2000, Table 2, Population).
running from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, and another contractionary
(or stationary) phase beginning in the mid-1990s.
The first phase saw an increase in AFDC benefits; enactment ofa
major piece of welfare legislationthe 1967 Social Security Amend-
mentswhich raised earnings disregards in the program (i.e., lowered
the tax rate on earnings); and the creation of the food stamp and Medic-
aid programs and, later in the period, the Supplemental Security Income
program. Caseloads grew rapidly in all four of these programs. This
period was later termed the era of the "welfare explosion" and set the
modern framework of means-tested transfers.
The second phase saw a steady decline in real AFDC benefits; enact-
ment of a major piece of AFDC legislationthe 1981 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Actwhich effectively eliminated the earnings disre-
gards enacted in 1967 and consequently cut thousands of families with
earnings from the rolls; and witnessed an increasing interest in work
requirements and mandatory training programs for welfare recipients
among federal policymakers. Declining real AFDC benefits were accom-
panied by slow but steady growth in the number of single-mother fami-
lies, and the offsetting effects of these two forces left AFDC expenditures
more or less unchanged in real terms.4Moffitt
The third phasewhich is not always recognized, for it is often pre-
sumed that the system has been in steady contraction since the 1970s
saw a dramatic expansion of theEarned Income Tax Credit (EITC); major
expansions of eligibility in the Medicaid program, primarily to non-
AFDC families; and sizable expansions of the caseload in the SSI pro-
gram, arising mostly from increasednumbers of disabled adults and
children. The Family Support Act of 1988, although occurring in the
third phase and seemingly contractionaryit mandated work and train-
ing for AFDC recipients more heavily than in the pastis bestviewed as
neutral, for not only was it never effectively implemented, but it also
could be interpreted as expansionary inasmuch as it required new expen-
ditures on work programs for AFDC recipients. The runup of expendi-
tures in this period, although not quite as large in magnitude asthat
resulting from the welfare explosion of the late 1960s and early 1970s,
occurred much more quicklyessentially occurring in a five-year period
between 1990 and 1995.
The fourth phase, which is continuing at this writing, is a combined
result of 1996 welfare legislation, which contracted the AFDC-TANF
program, and a robust economy which hasled to declining caseloads in
many programs, thereby slowingexpenditure growth. The Food Stamp
and Medicaid programs, as well as AFDC-TANF, have seen declining
caseloads.1
Table 1 shows, in more detail, the sources of expenditure growth in
the third, expansionary period. AFDC expenditures actually declined,
presaging the further decline which has occurred subsequent to the 1996
legislation. The Food Stamp program expanded by 42 percent, however,
indicating robust growth. A very large percentage expansion occurred in
the Medicaid program, which grew by 88 percent. As wifi be discussed
further below, the Medicaid program covers different types of recipi-
ents, and the growth over this period came not only fromexpansions of
expenditures for single mothers and their children, but also from in-
creased expenditures on the disabled. While single mothers and their
children represent the largest fraction of the Medicaid caseload, expendi-
tures are greater for the disabled because of their greater medicalneeds.
The largest percentage expansion in Table 1, however, occurred in the
EITC program, whose expenditures almost tripled over the period. As
wifi be discussed below, major expansions of the size of the credit re-
sulted in this growth. Housing programs grew modestly during the
1The unemployment rate appears to have started to increase in late 2000 or early 2001,
possibly indicating the beginning of a recession. Whether this will signal the beginning of a
fifth phase or a modification of the fourth remains to be seen, and wifi depend on legisla-
tive developments and on the course of expenditure growth over the next few years.Economic Effects of Means-Tested Transfers in the U.S.5
TABLE 1
Change in Real Expenditures' in Six Major Programs,
FY1990 to FY1996
Sources: Burke (1993, Table 15; 1999, Table 3, 12).
'Federal and state combined totals.
blncludes reduction in tax liability,not just refundable portion.
cSum of expenditures on public and Section 8 housing.
period, but the SSI program grew by a large amount, 59percent, reflect-
ing, as in Medicaid, increases in expenditureson the disabled.2
The last row of Table 1 shows the shares of total expendituregrowth in
the largest eighty means-tested transfers from 1990to 1996 accounted for
by each of these six programs. Medicaid expenditure growth,while not
the largest in percentage terms, is the largest in dollarterms and accounts
for the largest fraction, 60 percent. The EITC and SSI togetheraccount for
another 23 percent. Altogether, these sixprograms accounted for 93 per-
cent of the overall increase in means-tested expenditures in the 1990-1996
expansionary phase.
Finally, Table 2 shows the expenditures and caseloads in theten larg-
est means-tested transfer programs in FY 1997. The largest is Medicaid,
as expected, and the next fiveSSI, EITC, Food Stamps, TANF, and
subsidized housingare of the same general magnitude butat a large
distance from Medicaid. The TANF program, which in the 1960swas the
largest of the six, is now a distant fifth in rank.
The evolution of means-tested transfers which has ledto the ranking in
Table 2 reflects several trends. One is the gradual decline ofunrestricted
cash transfers like AFDC relative to in-kind transfers like Medicaid,Food
2If medical care prices are used to deflate Medicaid expenditures insteadof a general
price index, Medicaid expenditure growth amounted to only 34percent. Which index
should be used depends on whether the goal is to value expenditures from thepoint of






1990 1996 Program (%) (%)
AFDC 24,758 23,677 4 1
Food Stamps 20,654 27,344 42 7
Medicaid 84,658 159,357 88 60 EITCb 8,092 24,088 198 13 Housingc 16,922 19,877 17 4
SSI 20,125 32,065 59 106Moffitt
TABLE 2
Annual Expenditures and Caseloads in Ten Largest TransferPrograms,
FY1997
Source: Burke (1999, Table 12).
Stamps, and housing. Voters and legislators appear toprefer to make
transfers tied to specific consumption items rather thanopen-ended cash
transfers. A second is the increasing narrowness of the targetingof trans-
fers: the programs which have seen the largest growth in thelast decade
are tied to specific eligibffity groups.The EITC is specifically targeted to
families with earnings, the SSI program is targeted tothe disabled and
elderly, and Medicaid is targeted to the disabled andinthe expansions
that have occurredmainly to single mothersand their children off
TANF. This development represents a continued, if notincreased, cate-
gorization of the nation's welfare population into a systemin which
different demographic groups are judged to be needy notjust on the
basis of income but on the basis of some other specificcharacteristic that
leads them to be deserving in the eyes of thepublic. This also explains
why the EITC and SSI programs, which providetied cash transfers, have
expanded while the AFDCTANF program has not. As a consequenceof
these developments, the great expenditure expansionof the late 1980s
and early 1990s increased total transfers to the low-incomepopulation
but also changed the distribution of those transfers.Families off welfare
with earnings and the disabled gained, for example,relative to low-
income single-mother families as a whole,particularly those on welfare
or not working.
The transfer programs reviewed in the forthcomingNBER volume









Medicaid 167,359 40,446 4,138
SSI 32,395 6,984 4,638
EITC 28,800 58,143 495
FS 24,772 24,200 1,024
TANF 23,179 10,936 2,120
Subsidized housing 19,336 4,315 4,481
Medical care for veterans
without service disability
9,220 153 60,261
Foster care 6,794 289 23,509
Social service 6,400 NA NA
Federal Pell grants 5,660 3,665 1,544Economic Effects of Means-Tested Transfers in the U.s.7
smaller but important programs are covered. These includechild care
programs (approximate FY 1999 expenditures of $17 billionacross all
programs), programs for child-support enforcement ($3 billionin 1996),
and job training programs for the disadvantaged (expendituresof $1
billion in 1998).
These nine programs wifi be discussed in this chapterroughly in order
of their total expenditures. For eachprogram, the discussion first covers
the structure and rules of the program and its historicalevolution, fol-
lowed by a discussion of trends in expenditures and caseloadsand recipi-
ent characteristics, then followed by a review of research findings.
2. MEDICAID
The Medicaid program, as noted by Gruber (forthcoming),is really four
separate programs rolled into one. One supports the medicalexpenses
of low-income single mothers and their children. Theother three pro-
vide public insurance for portions of medical expendituresnot covered
by Medicare for the low-income elderly, support medicalexpenses for
the low-income disabled, and providecoverage of nursing-home expen-
ditures of the institutionalized elderly. The firstprogram has a majority
of the recipients, but the other threeprograms are responsible for a
majority of the expenditures.
Medicaid was created in 1965 by the same legislation that createdthe
Medicare program. It is administered by the states, whichmust operate
under federal regulation, and the federalgovernment pays a fixed share
of state expenditures (the state share, determined bya formula involving
various state characteristics including median income, isapproximately
43 percent). The program was initially aimed at providingmedical bene-
fits to traditional welfare populationslow-income singlemothers and
children, and the aged, blind, and disabled. However,over time eligibil-
ity has been expanded to other groups. Early in theprogram some
coverage was extended to low-income children in two-parent families,
and a Medically Needy program was instituted which providedcare for
low-income families (usually single-mother families) withincome too
high for welfare eligibility, albeit withnumerous restrictions on eligibil-
ity. Beginning in 1984, and accelerating after 1987,more significant ex-
pansions were first allowed, and then mandated, requiringstates to
cover children in families with incomes below 133 percent of the poverty
line, or higher at state option. Pregnantwomen were also covered, but
otherwise there was no expanded coverage for adults. Theseexpansions
are part of the reason for the expenditure increase discussed in the last
section. A further major expansion took place in 1997 with thecreation8Moffitt
of the Children's Health Insurance Program, whichprovides a capped
federal match for state creation of programs to cover groupsoutside of
existing Medicaid eligibility or with higher incomes. Somestates have
chosen to expand their Medicaid programs, while othershave created
wholly new programs to cover these additional groups.
Medicaid mandates a specific list of services that states mustprovide
to all "categorically needy" recipients. States may gobeyond this at their
option, but few do, and when they do, most states coverthe same types
of extra services; as a result, there is substantial uniformity inthe service
package across states. Reimbursement rates, on the otherhand, are
given much more leeway, and there is major cross-statevariation. Reim-
bursement rates are generally quite low and below those ofMedicare
and private payers. States are allowed waivers to experimentwith differ-
ent options for care provision, and the majordirection states have pur-
sued is the use of managed care for their Medicaidcaseloads. By 1998,54
percent of Medicaid recipients were in managed careplans.
Gruber shows that both expenditures and enrollment in theMedicaid
program have increased enormously overthe last decade, as indicated in
the background discussion above. The majorenrollment growth has
been among the disabled and among childrenunder 21. Enrollment
growth has slowed in recent years, possibly because of 1996federal
welfare reform legislation which contracted theAFDCTANF program.
Calculations of participation rates in the Medicaid programhave been
computed only for children and pregnant women, because they arethe
only groups for which eligibility has been calculated; noestimates are
available for the elderly and disabled. Eligibility has expandedgreatly, as
already noted, but takeup has slipped behind significantly,resulting in
declines in participation rates. Whereas participation rates amongeligi-
ble children were close to 100 percent prior to 1989,by 1996 they had
fallen to 73 percent.
There has been a great deal of research by economists onthe Medicaid
program. One issue concerns reasonsfor the declining participation
rates just noted. Research has shown thatmuch of the explanation is
that the increased eligibility arising from coverageexpansions was to
groups with higher than usual incomes, groupswith less need for insur-
ance; to groups outside the AFDC programand who therefore do not
have the relatively easy institutional access to the programthat welfare
recipients do; and to groups who already are coveredby other forms of
insurance. This last finding is related to a significant areaof research on
Medicaid crowdout, which occurs when Medicaid expansionsresult in
substitutions of Medicaid coverage for private insurance coverage.There
are a variety of empirical estimatesof the extent of crowdout, someEconomic Effects of Means-Tested Transfers in theU.s.9
indicating relatively small andsome quite large effects. For example, in
the latter category estimates have indicatedthat approximately 50 per-
cent of those who have taken up Medicaid would havebeen privately
covered otherwise. Research continues in thisarea in an attempt to
resolve the differences in the magnitude of theeffect.
Another area of research concerns the effect of theMedicaid expan-
sions on health and health outcomes. The studies whichuse nationwide
data rather than data from individualstates typically show significant
positive effects of the Medicaid expansionson infant mortality, prenatal
care utilization, and child preventative care, and that they ledto more
hospitalizations (but fewer "avoidable" ones).Research indicates that
the positive effects are larger for those indemographic groups with
typically worse health, such as black families,immigrants, and those
with low educational levels. Effectsare also larger for targeted expansions
which are aimed at low-income mothers andchildren than for broad
expansions which reach further up the income distribution.
The effect of the Medicaid programon the labor supply of recipients
and on their AFDCTANF participation decisionshas been another focus
on research, concentrating on single mothers and their childrenrather
than the elderly and disabled. There isa range of research using different
methodologies, and virtually all of it shows that theclose historical tie of
Medicaid eligibility to AFDC receipt tendedto increase AFDC participa-
tion rates, and that the Medicaid expansions whichloosened that tie also
tended to reduce AFDC participationrates. Also, because AFDC has
some work disincentives, the historical link has tended to decreaselabor
supply, while the Medicaid expansions have tendedto increase it. Al-
though the magnitudes of these effectsare not precisely estimated in the
literature, their direction is supported bymost studies. Related work on
the effect of Medicaid expansions demonstrates thatthey lowered sav-
ings and increased consumption, consistent with thenotion that welfare
recipients engage in less precautionary savings whenthey know that the
program wifi support them should their income decline.
Finally, there has been researchon the effects of reimbursement policy
and long-term care provision in Medicaid. The literatureon physician
reimbursement rates mostly shows that higherreimbursement rates lead
to somewhat increased participation by physicians in theprogram, in-
creased access to care, and occasionally betterhealth outcomes, al-
though the linkage between reimbursement policyand utilization and
health is far from simple. With regard to long-termcare, research indi-
cates that Medicaid recipients are oftenon long waiting lists and have
less access to care than privatepay patients, but also that increases in
subsidies to nursing home care raise overallnursing home utilization.10Moffitt
Some other research raises the issueof whether nursing home quality
might be reduced as nursing homes increasethe percentage of their
patients who are minimum-pay Medicaidrecipients.
3. THE SUPPLEMENTALSECURITY
INCOME PROGRAM
As described by Daly and Burkhauser(forthcoming), the SSI program is
a federal programwhich pays cash benefits to low-incomeindividuals
who are 65 or older, or who are blind ordisabled. It was enacted in 1972
and was to a large extent a product of theproposals by the Nixon admin-
istration for a negative income tax. Eligibilityrequires not only low in-
come and assets but also,for the blind and disabled, a medical test. The
test is most complex for disabled adultsand involves a multistep process
meant to ensure that the individual isincapable of working, for the goal
of the program is to serve only thosewho are totally disabled. Assess-
ments by medical examiners as well as moregeneral determinations of
the nature and severity of the disabilityand capacity for employment are
conducted. An earnings test is also used, which requiresthat applicants
earn less than a fixeddollar amount. All in all, about 63 percent of the
applicants are denied by this process.
Eligibffity determination for children is differentbecause the employ-
ment test is inappropriate; it is insteadbased on the presence of a severe
functional limitation. In 1990, a court decision (theZebley decision) re-
quired that children also be given aparticular additional functional
assessment test which, when laterimplemented, effectively lowered
eligibility standards by allowing children ontothe rolls who did not pass
the more formal medical tests. In the same1996 legislation that restruc-
tured the AFDC program, Congressnarrowed the basis for SSI child
eligibility and moved it back towards thepre-199O standard in breadth.
The legislation also denied SSI eligibility fornoncitizens.
The SSI program has work incentive featuresthat reflect its origins in
discussions of a negative income tax. Aftereligibility has been estab-
lished and individuals begin receivingbenefits, earnings (after disre-
gards) are reduced by only 50 cents for every extradollar of income, thus
providing some incentives to work. However,despite these incentives,
the percentage of SSI recipients with earningshas always been very low.
Only 4.4 percent of the caseload had earningsin 1996, and the propor-
tion had never exceeded 4.7 percent in thehistory of the program. In
addition, special incentives allowing workingbeneficiaries to retain
Medicaid coverage after their incomes exceednormal eligibility levelsEconomic Effects of Means-Tested Transfers in the U.s.11
have been taken up by only 1.3 percent of the caseload.Consequently,
work incentives are still a major issue in theprogram, and mechanisms
for increasing work are still under active discussion.
Caseload and expenditure growth in theprogram has been positive
since its inception in 1974 but was exceptionally high in theearly 1990s,
as noted previously. This growth was disproportionately concentrated
among the blind and disabled, children, and non-citizens (rather than
the elderly). Growth in the number of recipients whoqualified on the
basis of mental impairments was particularlystrong. Since the 1996 wel-
fare legislation, the child and non-citizen caseloads havedeclined. Never-
theless, despite the strong caseload growth in the 1990s,there has been
continued concern that many eligibles do not participatein the program.
Estimated participation rates among the eligible elderlypopulation, for
example, range from 45 to 60 percent.
Research on the SSI program has focusedon a number of issues. One of
the most heavily studied focuseson the reasons for the caseload growth.
Much of this research has examined historical fluctuationsin applications
and awards for the nonelderly. These fluctuations, shownin Figure 2,
have been very large. Increases in applications in the late1970s, subse-
quent declines in the early 1980s, and revived growth in the mid-1980scan
be explained largely by administrative changes inscreening stringency
over the period, as perceived by the eligible population. The rise in appli-
cations in the late 1980s and early 1990s anda portion of the decline after
1994 have been shown to be heavily affected by the businesscycle. This is
an important finding, because it establishes that labor-market participa-
tion is a realistic alternative for many disabledpersons, contrary to the
notion that only those incapable of workingare in the program. The
business cycle is also responsible for much of thevery large increase in
applications in the early 1990s, but only forsome eligibility groups.
Caseload growth among the disabled with mental health andmusculo-
skeletal (e.g., back pain) conditions, andamong children, were equally
the result of relaxation of screening and eligibility rules.Declines in appli-
cations subsequent to 1996 can also be partly attributedto the 1996 federal
legislation as well as the business cycle.
Another factor in the growth of the child caseload identifiedin the
research is the relationship between SSI and AFDC benefitlevels. For
AFDC families with children who can qualify for SSI, thegreater benefit
levels in SSI than in AFDC provide an incentiveto move children from
the latter program to the former. The gap between benefits hasalso been
growing over time. Research has shown that this has madesome contri-
bution to the growth in the child SSI caseload. In addition,related re-
search has shown that work disincentives for single mothersaccompany12Moffitt
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Source: Daly and Burkhauser (forthcoming).
this shift, as the availability of SSI benefits allowssingle mothers to
participate less in the labor market than they otherwisewould.
Some research has also been conducted on exploring reasonsfor the
low participation rates of SSI-eligible elderly.Lack of information about
the program does not seem to be a factor, butfinancial need does, for
many nonapplicants havealternative sources of income. Nevertheless,
the research on this subject has failed toclarify sufficiently why so many
eligibles fail to apply for the program.
Research on the work incentives of the SSI programhas yielded rather
discouraging results to date for the disabled.Disabled SSI recipients
appear to be relatively unresponsiveto financial incentives, and experi-
mental tests of programs which offer financialand other incentives to
undergo additional training or vocationalrehabilitation have experi-
enced very small takeup. In addition, as notedpreviously, very few
recipients take advantage of the less thanone-for-one benefit reduction
rate in the program. A major andcontinuing policy challenge in the
program is the search for mechanismsto encourage and allow disabled
recipients to fulfill their employmentpotential.
4. THE EARNED INCOME TAXCREDIT
The EITC, as noted by Hotz and Scholz(forthcoming), has been one of the
fastest-growing means-tested tax programs in the country.Its popularity
-Awards
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stems from its emphasis on rewarding families that have significant levels
of employment and earnings. The program providesa refundable tax
credit, which can be as high as $3,800a year (1999), to families with
earnings. A small credit to childless families is also available. Theprogram
was introduced into the tax code in 1975, but did not see significant
expansion in generosity until the 1980s, when the size of the subsidywas
increased and then indexed to inflation. Tax bills in 1990 and 1993in-
creased the amount of subsidy greatly and have led to the sizablegrowth
in expenditures in the 1990s which was noted earlier.
The subsidy is obtained by filing a tax return and reporting thenum-
ber of qualifying children in the household and the earnings of thefather
and mother. The size of the tax credit is proportional to earningsup to
some maximum level, and then is phased out as earnings increase. In
1999, for example, a two-child family could receivea credit equal to 40
percent of their earnings up to an annual earnings level of $9,540, and
the credit was phased out at a 21-percent rate until the credit fellto zero,
which occurred at an earnings level of $30,580. Thus families fairly high
in the income distribution were eligible for benefits. Fourteenstates and
the District of Columbia have state EITCs which provide for furthertax
credits.
An issue in the administration of the EITC has beenoverpayment of
subsidies, which in 1995 were estimated to be 25 percent oftax expendi-
tures. Most of these result from inaccuracies in the claim for qualifying
children. While the overpayments are high, it is often noted that17
percent of taxes are not paid to the IRS overall and more than 25 percent
of taxes are not paid for some forms of capital income and incomefrom
the informal sector. In addition, despite the overpayments in theEITC,
participation rates of EITC eligibles appear to be less than 100percent,
sometimes much less so. For example, participation ratesamong eligible
single mothers, who historically have low tax filing rates, have been
estimated to be in the range of 42 to 54 percent.
Much of the research on the EITC has concerned its effectson work
incentives, since this is one of the main appeals of theprogram. While
the EITC should increase labor force participation, 77percent of families
eligible for the credit fall into the flat or phaseout region of thecredit,
where there are more likely to be work disincentives than workincen-
tives. Most studies have indicated that there isa strong and significant
positive effect on the labor-force participation rates of single-mother
households. The participation rates of such households have risenmark-
edly over the last decade, and the FITC isone of the leading causes of
that increase. At the same time, however, research has suggestedthat
the program may have had a slight negative effecton the employment14Moffitt
rates of married women, for many women aremarried to men who earn
sufficiently high wages that additional earnings fromthe wife fall into
the phaseout region of the EITC (that is,the region where additional
earnings actually reduce the amount of thecredit). In addition, there is
some evidence that,while increasing employment rates overall, the
EITC may have lessened the hours of workof men and women in two-
career families.
There has also been some concern that theEITC may discourage mar-
riage because men and women in certain earnings ranges canreceive a
greater EITC sum by not marrying andfiling separate returns than by
marrying and filing joint returns. Theempirical evidence to date, how-
ever, suggests little effectof this incentive on actual patterns of marriage.
There has also been some research on theadvance payment option in
the EITC by which recipients can receive theircredit over the tax year in
question, as they earn wages, rather than in alump sum at the end of
the year or in the following spring. Some observersbelieve that the work
incentives of the EITC would be greater if recipientscould see the link
between their earnings and the credit morequickly and immediately.
Hotz and Scholz point out the high administrativecosts of making this
option more widespread, however, anddescribe the potential for non-
compliance and fraud which would make monitoringprocedures neces-
sary. The advance paymentoption is used in the United Kingdom in a
somewhat different program, but it appears thatlittle monitoring for
noncompliance is conducted there.
5. FOOD AND NUTRITIONPROGRAMS
As discussed by Currie (forthcoming), theFood Stamp program (FSP) is
only one among several programs that supportfood expenditure and
nutrition among low-income families. The FSP isthe largest, but also
important are the Special Supplemental NutritionProgram for Women,
Infants, and Children (WIC), the National SchoolLunch Program (NLSP),
and the School Breakfast Program (SBP). Expenditures onthe latter three
programs are over 50 percentof those of the FSP, thus constituting a
sizable additional amount of spending. All of these programs arefederally
financed and uniform across the states. Also, there are manyother
smaller programs that support food and nutrition inthe U.S., covering
smaller and more specialized populations.
The FSP provides food assistance to families andindividuals, regard-
less of family structure, who meet income and assetconditions. Families
on TANF, SSI, or general assistance areautomatically eligible. The nomi-
nal tax rate on earnings in the programthe amountby which benefitsEconomic Effects of Means-Tested Transfers in the U. S.15
are reduced for each dollar increase in incomeis 30 percent, but this
rate is affected by the presence of deductions and exemptions. Benefits
have historically been paid by the issuance ofpaper coupons but re-
cently have been increasingly paid by electronic transfers using debit
cards. This change has been thought to reduce the incidence of fraudu-
lent selling of paper coupons, although the extent of that activity has
never been accurately determined. The FSP began as a small pilot pro-
gram in 1961 and was gradually expanded over time, finally being man-
dated for all counties in 1974. It was indexed to inflation in the 1970s,
thus preventing the decline in real benefit amounts experienced in the
AFDC program. The program was largely untouched by the 1996 federal
welfare legislation that restructured AFDC, although work requirements
and eligibility for certain categories of single adults as well as immigrants
were restricted.
The WIC, NSLP, and SBP are quite different. WIC provides financial
assistance for the purchase of nutritious foods, nutrition education, and
access to health services for pregnant or lactating women and children
under 5. It is thus aimed specifically at improving nutritionamong
women and young children. Eligibility requires not only low income and
assets but also that the women and children be at "nutritional risk," such
as having inadequate or inappropriate nutritional intakes, specific
nutrition-related health deficiencies, large weight-for-height,or a num-
ber of other measures that are set by the states. The NLSP and SBP allow
children in low-income families to receive reduced-price or free school
lunches or breakfasts. They are thus like the FSP in subsidizing food
expenditure per se but like the WIC in having a specific target popula-
tion. In addition, the meals provided to the children must meet USDA
nutritional guidelines, although there has been some concern recently
that the meals remain high in fat and low in certain nutrients. The NLSP
is the far larger program of the two, having almost five times larger
expenditure than the SBP.
Caseloads in the FSP rose in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but have
fallen since the enactment of 1996 welfare reform legislation. The data
show that this is partly the result of an improving economyas well, but
partly a result of the decline in AFDC-TANF caseloads, for participation
rates among eligibles have also declined. Expenditures and caseloads in
the WIC and NSLP programs, on the other hand, having risen in the late
1980s and early 1990s, have continued to rise in the mid-1990s, albeit ata
slower rate.
There has been a considerable amount of researchon the FSP, WIC,
and NLSP programs. One area of research has focusedon the effects of
these programs on food expenditures, nutrient availability, and nutrient16Moffitt
intake. Research indicates unequivocally that the FSP increases food ex-
penditures, although not dollar for dollar, implying that recipients re-
duce some food expenditure out of their own income and spend it on
other goods. It also appears that the program increases nutrientavail-
abilitythat is, the nutritional content of the foods purchased or brought
into the homebut the evidence on nutritional intake (i.e., taking ac-
count of wastage and food eaten away from home) ismuch weaker.
Evidence on the WIC program generally indicates favorable effects on
child birth weight but also that the program tends to discourage breast
feeding, which is generally preferable to using infant formula. The latter
effect arises because the WIC program gives free formula to participating
mothers. The effect of WIC on infant outcomes is more variable, but the
evidence does indicate increases in nutrient consumption and reductions
in the incidence of anemia. Research on the NLSP indicates that it im-
proves nutrient intake.
There have also been a number of studies on the determinants of
participation rates in the FSP, for such rates are generally in the range of
60 percent, and thus not all eligibles are in the program.The research
indicates that three factors are important in explaining nonparticipation
in the program: lack of information about eligibility forthe program,
transactions costs which make participation onerous, and the stigma of
being a welfare recipient. Research on the WIC program indicates that
administrative barriers to participation are an important factor in explain-
ing lack of takeup. In the NLSP, an additional factor isthe nutrient
content of the lunches offered, for it appears that the higherthe nutrient
content, the less likely students are to participate. Steps tomake the
school lunches both nutritious and appealing to students have been
discussed.
Two other areas of research on these programs concern whetherthe
FSP should be cashed outthat is, whether cash should be provided to
recipients instead of food couponsand whether the programshave a
negative effect on work incentives. The first of these issues is motivated
in large part by the rather low levels of FSP coupons relative toprivate
food expenditures of the poor, suggesting that the coupons simply sub-
stitute for private food spending and hence are no differentthan cash
welfare to the recipient. Interestingly, both econometric evidence and
evidence from cashout demonstrations indicate that Food Stamp cou-
pons have a greater effect on foodexpenditures than does cash, creating
a puzzle that has not beenadequately explained. The second of these
questions concerns the traditional issue of whether a welfare program
such as the FSP, which provides assistance even to those who do not
work, has work disincentives. The several studies on this issueshowEconomic Effects of Means-Tested Transfers in theU.S.17
relatively little labor-supplyresponse to the program, perhaps because
its benefits are small relative to other forms ofincome received by the
household.
6. The AFDCTANF Program
Despite its decline, in terms of caseloadsand expenditures, to a point
where it is only the fifth-largest means-testedprogram in the country, the
AFDCTANF program continues to receive themost attention from pol-
icymakers, the general public, and researchers.In his review of past and
current research developments in theprogram, Moffitt (forthcoming)
charts its growth and declineover the last three decades and reviews the
research conducted on it. Theprogram was created by the 1935 Social
Security Act, was targeted at low-incomechildren living with onlyone
biological parent, and was intendedto support widows with children.
The caseload grew slowly through the1950s and then accelerated in the
1960s and early 1970s. Subsequent to the1970s, benefit levels in the
program declined in real terms and an emphasison work requirements
steadily grew. The 1988 Family Support Actmandated employment pro-
grams in all states but required a human-capital, education-and-training
emphasis to be part of the program mix. But the 1996Personal Responsi-
bility and Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)changed the program in more
fundamental ways, by devolving theresponsibility of major program
design elements as well as financingto the individual states, imposing
strict work requirements in order to qualify forfederal aid, and imposing
lifetime limits on the number ofyears of benefit receipt which could be
paid to a parent out of federal funds.
Table 3 shows the major elements of the1996 Act and how they
changed the program. The legislation converted theprevious matching
grant to a block grant and removed much of the federalregulatory au-
thority over the design of theprogram, leaving the states free to set the
benefit level, tax rate, income limits,asset requirements, and even the
form of assistance (cash or in-kind services).In addition, no federal
definition of who is to be included in theassistance unit is imposed;
states can cover two-parent families at theirown discretion, for example.
The entitlement nature of theprogram is abolished, and states are not
required to serve all eligibles. At thesame time, however, the law im-
posed new federal authority ina few specified areas. Federal funds are
not to be used to pay adults formore than 60 months of TANF bene-
fits over their lifetimes (although statesare allowed an exemption from
this requirement for 20 percent of theircaseloads), and new workre-
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fractions of the caseload and which exemptmany fewer families (as
many as 50 percent of single-mother recipients and 90 percent of two-
parent families must comply). Recipients involved in general education
and training cannot be counted toward these participation requirements;
most activities require direct work.
The most important new features are the time limits and work require-
ments. Lifetime time limits are a new concept in U.S. transferprograms
and are based on a quite different philosophy of the aims of public assis-
tance than has been the case heretofore, namely, that families are only
entitled to temporary assistance. States have embraced time limits with
vigor: half of them have chosen to adopt time limits even shorter than the
federal five-year maximum. The work requirements in thenew legisla-
tion are much stronger than in previous law and change its orientation
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from education and training to work per Se. Indeed, most stateshave
adopted a work-first approach in which recipients and newapplicants for
benefits are moved as quickly as possible into work of anykind, with a
deemphasis on education and training. The law also allows states to
impose sanctions on recipients for failure tocomply with the work re-
quirements, sanctions which are much strongerthan in past law and
which have been actively enforced. With the aim of reinforcingthe effect
of these work requirements on employment, stateshave generally low-
ered their tax rates to encourage work as well, a featurethat historically
has been strongly supported by economists whobelieve they will provide
work incentives.
Another new goal of welfare programs in the 1990s has been toreduce
the rate of nonmarital childbearing and to encouragemarriage. Al-
though there were few provisions of the PRWORA legislationthat were
directly aimed at these family-structure outcomes, the provisionsaimed
at reducing the amount of government assistanceand encouraging
women to sustain themselvesoff welfare were thought to implicitly
encourage marriage and discouragenonmarital childbearing.
As shown previously in Table 1 and as discussedearlier, caseloads in
the AFDCTANF program have been falling forseveral years, and real
expenditures have been declining. The per capita TANFcaseload is now
below what it was in 1970. The decline began prior to 1996but acceler-
ated thereafter. Expenditures have also changed incomposition, as a
smaller fraction is devoted to traditional cash expendituresand a larger
fraction is devoted to noncash expenditures on servicessuch as child
care and other social services,reflecting a preference by states to support
families in those ways. Real benefits also fell from the1970s until the
mid-1990s, when the decline abated and benefit amountsleveled off. It
is important to note that the recent reforms havecontracted the program
in many ways, but reductions in benefit amount have notbeen one of
them.
The characteristics of AFDCTANF recipients havechanged in some
ways over time, but not dramatically.The one major change has been a
shift in the types of single mothers on the rolls. Whereasthe program
began with a caseload composed mostly of widows, itshifted in the
1960s and 1970s to one composed mostly of divorced women.It then
shifted again in the 1980s to one composed mostly of nevermarried
single mothers who have had children out of wedlock.These trends
partially parallel larger trends in the society. They may alsopartially
explain the decline in popularity of the program among voters.
Economic research on the AFDC and TANF programs hasbeen large in
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labor supply and work effort. The researchon this issue indicates that
transfer programs like AFDC which provide open-endedsupport reduce
work effort and that providing unrestricted benefitsto those who do not
work has work disincentives. At thesame time, research on the effect of
reducing tax rates on recipientsby increasingearnings disregards
shows it to have a much smaller positive effecton overall labor supply
than expected, because tax rate reduction has the offsettingeffect of draw-
ing additional women onto the rolls and inducing themto decrease their
work effort. One way to reduce this offset isto provide additional work
incentives to those off welfare as wellas on, that is, to provide a more
universal work subsidy (to low-income families) that isnot tied to welfare.
The EITC is one program of this kind. Otherprograms that have been
proposed allow women to "take" their subsidy off therolls and to con-
tinue to obtain earnings supplements afterward.
Under TANF, most states have increased their earningsdisregards but
the existing evidence therefore suggests that this willhave little effect on
overall work effort. However, thenew work requirements are more
likely to have a positive effect. Theoreticalresearch on work require-
ments strongly suggest they wifi increase work effort,as should be
expected, with a possible cost ifsome recipients who need assistance
cannot comply and leave the welfare rolls. However, workrequirements
require that the welfare system be converted toa categorical program
which divides recipients into those whocan and cannot work, and im-
poses the work requirements only on the former. Dividing the caseload
up in such a way is difficult and opens the door to possible inequitable
treatment as borderline cases are assigned toone group or another and
either gain or lose as a consequence. The theoretical literaturein this area
cannot answer the practical question of how well categorizationcan be
implemented but it does highlight the tradeoff betweenbetter targeting
of assistancethat is, providing work requirementsto some recipients
but benefits without requirements to othersand thecosts of making
that separation.
Another area of economic research has focusedon the relative merits
of the work-first approach embodied in TANF andmore education,
human-capital oriented approaches. There have beena long series of
evaluations of different types of employment and trainingprograms in
the AFDC program which, overall, show that modestpositive effects on
earnings can be achieved with relatively low-cost job searchand job
assistance programs even for the very unskilled populationthat the
program covers. Typical gains, for example, are in the range of $300-600
per year. Research to date on work-first programs indicates that they
have a more immediate effect on employment andearnings than human22Moffitt
capital programs, but one which fades out overtime. Human capital
programs appear to have effectsthat are more long-lasting. No clear
winner emerges in this comparison, and manyresearchers have taken
the rather different tack of investigatingwhether different programs
might be tailored to different individuals,commonly called a mixed
strategies approach, in which some recipients aredeemed sufficiently
job-ready that a work-first approach is bestwhile others are seen to be in
more need of basic skillstraining.
The other major feature of TANF, time limits,has also been the subject
of considerable research attention. Researchershave noted that, while
time limits should eventually force recipientsoff the welfare rolls with
consequent increases in employment andearnings, recipients may also
take action to leave the rolls early in order tobank their benefits for a
later time when they are most in need of them.Indeed, the most impor-
tant development thus far is howfew recipients have hit time limits. The
massive reduction in the caseload, whether ithas been the result of a
good economy or of welfare reform, andregardless of whether some of
it has been the result of banking behavior,has had the result that many
families have not used up their years of eligibility eventhough five years
have passed since 1996. However, this maychange as the economy
slows down and as states with five-year timelimits experience more
families hitting those limits.
A large volume of research has beendevoted to estimating the overall
effects of the 1996 PRWORA legislation andof the creation of the TANF
program. Descriptive evidence,for example, reveals that employment
rates of single mothers haveincreased and that the incomes of all but a
small lower tail of the distribution have risensince the legislation. A
sizable body of research has sought todisentangle the effects of the
economy from those of welfarereform in explaining these trends. The
majority of results from this literatureindicate that the law has indeed
had a significant and large additional effectbeyond that of the strong
economy. Prima facie evidencefor this view is that, after 1996, the de-
cline in the national unemployment rateslowed but the decline in the
AFDCTANF caseload accelerated.
Another area of research has focused on the effectsof welfare benefits
on family structureand other demographic outcomes. Research on the
effect of AFDC on these outcomes is quitelarge in volume and has
gradually moved, over the past decade, to a consensusthat there are
some non-zero effects ofthis kindthat is, that variation in AFDC bene-
fits across states, received primarily bysingle mothers and not two-
parent families, tends to be positivelycorrelated with the rate of single
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gle motherhood in the U.S.,on the other hand, suggests that that in-
crease is primarily the result of deeper economic and social forcessuch
as the rise in female job opportunities and the decline in unskilledmale
wages. The TANF program, while having few direct provisions relating
to marriage or fertility (aside from family caps),nevertheless was in-
tended to have a positive effecton marriage and a negative effect on
nonmarital fertility. The research evidence to date, however,is mixed at
best in its results. There is little sign in the dataof a strong effect of
welfare reform per se on these outcomes, again,perhaps, because they
are so driven by larger social, cultural, and economic forces.
While the research evidenceon the overall effects of welfare reform is
by now reasonably large in volume and hasyielded important new
findings, most of the research on the effects of detailedindividual provi-
sions of TANFtime limits, work requirements,and so onhas unfor-
tunately foundered on difficulties of evaluatingtheir effects. By and
large, researchers have not been successfulin using the variation in
programs across states to isolate the independent effects of these individ-
ual components of reform, and to estimate howmuch of the overall
effect would have occurred if all elements of reformhad been enacted
except each of these components, in turn. Thecross-state variation un-
der TANF is sufficiently great, and thetypes of program variation so
complex, that the effects of the componentsper se have not thus far
been sufficiently isolated. Random-assignmentevaluations could in prin-
ciple do better, for they could be designedto alter each component while
holding the others fixed, but they havenot been designed in that way
thus far.
Finally, there has been considerable researchattention paid to the
effects of the block grant system put in place byPRWORA. The conven-
tional view based on existing researchon the effects of matching grants,
which were used for AFDC, and blockgrants, which are in place for
TANF, is that they have different price effectsbecause the latter does not
subsidize state expenditures above the blockgrant at all, whereas the
former does. This should curtail spendingover the block grant amount.
Theoretical research has also shown the possibilityof a "race to the
bottom," as states facinga high price of expenditures lower their bene-
fits to avoid immigration of thepoor from other states, causing a cascad-
ing series of benefit reductions by all thestates. However, to date none
of these effects have occurred because theblock grant allocations made
to the states are generally much inexcess of what states are spending,
primarily because of the marked decline in thecaseload and consequent
reduction in state spending. Ascertaining whetherthe block grant struc-
ture wifi lead to restricted state spendingor to benefit reductions around24Moffitt
the country will have to await aperiod when welfare spending rises up
to the block grant level, where itwifi become binding.
7. HOUSING PROGRAMS
The set of housing programs for low-incomefamilies in the U.S. consti-
tute a complex mix of programswith different features. As noted by
Olsen (forthcoming), new programs havebeen added to the system over
time and the rules of existing programshave changed frequently. These
programs are much moreexpensive than commonly realized because
they rely to a much greater extent thanother welfare programs on indi-
rect subsidies that do not appear inthe records of the administering
agency.
Programs divide up into those that areproject-based (owned either by
the government or by private contractorswho are subsidized by the
government) and those which are tenant-based, inwhich eligible fami-
lies receive subsidies to defray the rent inprivate housing. The public
housing program, begun in the 1930s, is thebest-known project-based
program; it offers rental units tolow-income families in newly con-
structed projects owned and operated by thegovernment. Beginning in
1954, the government began in addition tocontract with private parties
to construct low-income housing or torehabilitate existing housing for
this purpose, in most cases insuring the mortgagesof the contractors.
The Section 8 New Construction Programestablished in 1974 is the
largest program of this type. Under this program,the government subsi-
dized the construction costs of privatelybuilt housing for low-income
families and provided monthly rental payments.In 1983, Congress halted
additional commitments under HUD's newconstruction programs except
for small programs for the elderly anddisabled. Today the largest hous-
ing subsidy program is tenant-based.3The Housing Choice Voucher
Program enacted in 1998 consolidatedthe two variants of the Section 8
Existing Housing Program that hadoperated simultaneously for fifteen
years. This program pays aportion of the rent of eligible low-income
households that locate housing in the privatemarket that meets the
program's minimum housing standards.Although HUD or USDA pro-
grams have produced few newunits in recent years, the IRS's Low
Income Housing Tax Credit, enactedin 1986, will soon become the
However, as Olsen discusses, the Low IncomeHousing Tax Credit, enacted in 1986, pays
70 percent of the development costs of projects forlow-income families and has become
the second-largest housing program in the country.Economic Effects of Means-Tested Transfers in theU.s.25
second-largest housing program in thecountry and it is growing much
more rapidly than any other program.
Eligibffity for these housing programs is basedon a number of factors,
the first being the requirement that adjusted familyincome fall below
certain thresholds determined by family size andthe median income in
the locality. However, because fixed budgetsare authorized for these
programs and there is excess demand for subsidies, theymust be ra-
tioned; that is, housing programsare not entitlements. Local housing
authorities and owners of private projects,operating under general
guidelines from Congress, determine their preferencesin granting assis-
tance to individual families by giving weightto characteristics of the
families. Once assistance is granted, familiesin project-based programs
are offered specific units and families in tenant-basedprograms are au-
thorized to locate eligible units in the privatemarket. A substantial ma-
jority of assisted families participate inprograms that require them to
pay 30 percent of their income toward rent. However,many assisted
families pay rent that is independent of income.
Research on housing programs has addresseda number of different
topics. One concerns the cost-effectiveness ofdifferent program types.
The studies are unanimous in finding thattenant-based assistance pro-
vides housing equal in quality to that ofproject-based assistance at a
much lower total cost. Another key issue is whetherthe programs indeed
increase the housing consumption of theirrecipientscertainly a main
goal of the program, but not one guaranteedto occur, at least for project-
based housing. The literature indicates indeedthat housing consumption
is raisedthat is, that familiesoccupy higher-quality housing than they
would in the absence of the programbothin housing projects and
housing occupied by voucher recipients. Thereappears to be some leak-
age in the subsidy, for consumption of nonhousing goodsrises as well,
although this should be expected if part of thegoal is to enable families to
reduce what are often very high housingexpenditures. The housing
programs also appear, according to the research, to increasehousing
consumption more than would a pure cashgrant, consistent with the
rationale for housing assistance.
The Housing Allowance Supply Experimentconducted in the 1970s
studied the market effects ofan entitlement housing voucher program
similar to the limited enrollment Section 8Voucher Program that oper-
ated between 1983 and 1998. The SupplyExperiment operated for ten
years in two small metropolitan areas withvery different initial vacancy
rates and minority populations. About 20percent of the families in the
two counties were eligible to receive assistance.Participation rates of26Moffitt
eligibles never exceeded 50 percent, partlybecause subsidies for those
with moderately high incomes were notlarge enough to outweigh the
costs of moving and participatingin the program. The resultsshowed
that an entitlement program oftenant-based assistance would produce a
substantial increase in the supply of dwelling unitsmeeting minimum
housing standards but would have littleeffect on rent levels.
There have been a few research studies onother topics as well. Some
examine the work disincentives of housing programs,on the presump-
tion that, like all welfare programs, thereduction in the subsidy with an
increase in earnings wifi reduce theincentive to work. The results show
that such work disincentives probably existbut that they are quite small.
Another set of studies examine the relativeeffects of public housing and
tenant-based housing on the choice ofneighborhood, finding that public
housing exacerbates economic andracial segregation while tenant-based
subsidies ameliorate them to some extent.Findings from the recent Mov-
ing to Opportunity Experiment thatoffered randomly selected families in
public housing vouchers on the conditionthat they move to neighbor-
hoods with very low poverty rates indicateimprovements in the educa-
tional attainment of the children involvedand reductions in their violent
criminal behavior. It also increases the earningsof adults in these families.
8. CHILD CAREPROGRAMS
Blau (forthcoming) describes the structureof means-tested child care pro-
grams in the U.S. He notesthat such programs have at least three
different goals, not always mutuallycompatible. One is to increase the
rate of employment of low-income women,particularly when operated
through the AFDC-TANF program orwhen aimed at assisting low-
income parents in general to work.A second is to increase the quality of
child care for low-income children, and athird is to assist in the develop-
ment of disadvantaged childrenthrough early education programs such
as Head Start. These goals mayconflict, as they do for programs which
encourage low-income women towork through the provision of inexpen-
sive child care.
A variety of programs serve one or moreof these goals. One of the
largest is the Child Care and DevelopmentFund (CCDF), which pro-
vides funds to states to subsidize child carefor low-income families and
is intended to support employmentof low-income parents. It was cre-
ated in 1996 by Congress and consolidated anumber of prior programs,
some of which had servedprimarily the AFDC population and some of
which had served the "working poor," meaninglow-income families not
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that minimum percentages of the grant be spenton the AFDCTANF-
based population (not only current recipients, but also familieswho had
recently left AFDC or are at risk of going on) and that minimumpercent-
ages be expended on the working poor. A second program, the Title XX
Social Services Grant, provides states with funds to expendon a variety
of social services for the poor, including childcare; states spend approxi-
mately 15 percent of their funds on that service. The DependentCare
Tax Credit, a nonrefundable tax credit in the federal incometax, also
provides a subsidy for child care, which declinesas income rises. Fi-
nally, three programs are intended for early education and childdevelop-
ment, and are not tied to parental employment. These include theHead
Start and Title I-A programs, which provide early education fordisad-
vantaged children, and the Child Care and Adult Food Program,which
provides subsidies for nutritious meals in childcare settings for low-
income children. All the programsare federally financed and have uni-
form national rules, except the CCDF and Title XX Social ServicesBlock
Grant, which give considerable discretion to thestates on operation
within federal guidelines.
In terms of expenditure on low-income families, the CCDFand Head
Start programs are currently the largest at about $5 billion each,followed
by the Dependent Care Tax Credit at approximately $3 billion.The num-
ber of children served is the largest in the Dependent CareTax Credit,
followed by the CCDF; Head Start isone of the smallest. Expenditures
per child are essentially inversely related to size: the Dependent Care
Tax Credit gives $720 per child, while Head Start gives$5,759 per child.
Eligibility in the three federal early-educationprograms is related to
various measures of low income and is nationwide, while eligibilityin the
CCDF and Title XX Grant is set by the states within federalguidelines.
Title XX funds must be spent on children in families withincome below
entirely state-chosen limits, while CCDF funds must bespent on families
with income no greater than 85 percent of state medianincome. States are
free to set a wide variety of subsidy mechanisms in theirCCDF-funded
programs, with fees that have maximums and minimumsor are waived
for certain groups, with vouchersor direct contracts with providers,
and with flexibility in setting reimbursementrates for providers. Child
care facilities must meet state licensing and regulatory requirements.
Research on the effects of child careprograms has been concentrated
on a few selected issues. One is whether child care subsidies in general
increase the employment of mothers. Basedon evidence from demon-
strations and random-assignment trials as wellas from nonexperimental
studies which use variation in childcare price to estimate employment
responsiveness, the literature strongly indicates that childcare subsidies28Moffitt
increase employment and hours ofwork. However, the magnitude of
the effect is quite uncertain and varies considerably acrossstudies. In
his review, Blau finds that the studieswith the best data and which
account most realistically for the child-caremarket find relatively low
price elasticities of employment response, but onesthat are still statisti-
cally significant.
Research on several other issues has been conducted aswell. One
study of the effect of price on the qualityof care chosen by parents using
formal day care centers found that child care subsidiesled parents to use
more care but care atlower-quality centers, as measured by childstaff
ratios and staff training. Another studyexamined the effect of child-care
subsidies on the probability that a single motherwould be on AFDC,
and found that such subsidies lower thatprobability, presumably by
allowing AFDC mothers to go off welfare andwork. Blau also reviews
the large literature on the effect of earlychildhood education on child
outcomes, finding that the evidence supports aneffect of such education
on some outcomes for some programs.Whether the effects fade out over
time or persist is more controversial,although some studies do show
persistent effects.
9. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAININGPROGRAMS
As discussed by LaLonde (forthcoming), the mainomnibus employment
and training program in the U.S. at the presenttime is the Workforce
Investment Act (WIA). Passed by Congress in 1998and taking effect on
July 1, 2000, WIA replaced the Job TrainingPartnership Act (JTPA),
which was the main program for employmentand training in the U.S.
from 1982 to 1998. WIA provides block grants tothe states to fund
employment and training programs for adultsand youth. WIA contains
several titles with different programs and differentservices. These in-
dude Title I.B.5, which covers adults; Title 1 .B.4,which covers youth;
and Title 1 .C, which covers the Job Corps, a high costtraining program
for disadvantaged youth.
Except for the Job Corps, states have greatfreedom to design their
own WIA-funded programsbut must meet certain federal requirements.
The adult programs are not restricted to low-income persons,but prior-
ity must be given to cash welfare recipients.Training programs for
youth, on the other hand, both the Job Corps and otheryouth programs,
do require that the recipient have low incomeand other measures of
economic disadvantage. All adults are eligible forjob search assistance,
but more comprehensive services requirethat the recipient be unem-
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to maintain employment. Training is primarily provided through individ-
ual training accounts, which allow the individual to choose froma list of
acceptable providers, and thus retains some features of a voucher. A
system of "one-stop shopping" is required by the legislation, allowing
WIA enrollees to go to only one agency, provider, or location to be
directed to all services.
There are three generic types of training programs typically provided.
One general category is aimed at enhancing skill development, and in-
cludes both classroom training and on-the-job training. A second is
"work experience," which involves temporary placement in an actual
job. A third is employability development, which includes job search
assistance and career counseling. The first is aimed at increasing the
individual's long-run labor-market skill level, while the second and third
are aimed more at encouraging immediate employment. Typically, an
individual's needs are first assessed, and then he or she is assigned to
one of these types of programs.
There is no research on the WIA program, because it has been put in
place so recently. However, there is a large body of research on JTPA
and related training programs, which should still be quite relevant to
WIA, given that the basic types of programs are unlikely to change
markedly. The majority of the research surveyed by LaLonde is from
random-assignment evaluations, where the effects of the trainingpro-
gram in question are measured as the difference in outcomesusually
earnings and employmentbetween an experimental group and acon-
trol group. These experiments typically estimate training effectssepa-
rately for adult women, adult men, and youth. Adultwomen are always
separated because they include a high fraction of welfare recipients and,
indeed, many of the training programs are explicitly targeted at that
group.
The findings are quite different by group. For adultwomen, there is
consistent evidence of positive effects of a variety of types of training
programs on employment and earnings. The programs include weifare-
to-work programs tested by individual states on their welfare recipients,
high-cost programs for disadvantaged women in general (suchas Sup-
ported Work), and the JTPA program. The effects persist for several
years and occur for all program types (job search assistance, work experi-
ence, and employability development). For the job search assistance
programs, the magnitudes of the effects are modest in sizeranging up
to $500 per year, typicallybut are also very modest in cost, leading to
very favorable cost-effectiveness ratios. Programs that provide class-
room instruction or which add work experience on top of job search
assistance have somewhat greater effects. The high-cost programs, such30Moffitt
as Supported Work, have even greatereffects, ranging up to $1,000 per
year. Whether they are cost-effectivedepends crucially on whether these
effects are permanent or fade over time. In the favorable event thatthey
are permanent, even these programshave strong cost-effectiveness ra-
tios (e.g., 15-percent rates of return).
The estimates for adult men and youth are more mixed. For men,
most evaluations show little effect on employment and earningsoverall.
Some programs appear to have positive effects for certain subgroupsof
men, but the pattern does not have anyclear explanation. For youth,
effects estimated in the Supported Work experiment as well as JTPA and
other training programs are typically very small. However, for youth,
the Job Corps has traditionally been thought of as the main program
showing favorable results, based on past evaluations. A new experimen-
tal evaluation confirms that its effects on employment and earnings are
positive. Four years after enrollment, annual earnings were on theorder
of 12 percent higher. The effectiveness of the Job Corps in comparison
with some of the other youth programs is thought to arise from the
comprehensiveness of its training services as well as the relatively large
expenditures on it. However, LaLonde also shows that subgroup analy-
ses present a mixed picture of Job Corpseffects, which vary markedly
by age and ethnicity. Indeed, for some subgroups (e.g., 16-24 year old
Hispanics) the program appears to have no effect. There also is some
support in the data for effects being greater for youngadults than for
teenagers, but even this result is not completelyuniform.
LaLonde concludes his review by emphasizing the positive findings
for adult women and youth. For adult women, low-cost training pro-
grams have a fairly large effect relative to costand constitute what ap-
pears to be a worthwhile investment. He notesthat the cost of these
programs is far less than the cost of a yearof formal schooling, for
example, and should not be expected to have dramatic impact as a re-
sult. Higher-cost programs may be cost-effective as well, but this de-
pends on the size of their long-term effect, about which little is known.
For youth, it appears that only high-cost comprehensive training pro-
grams are likely to be productive social investments.The U.S. spends far
less than other countries on training programs, and this evidence sug-
gests that a greater expenditure in that direction could increasethe earn-
ings of many groups in the disadvantaged population.
10. CHILD SUPPORT
The child support system in the U.S., while not formally ameans-tested
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tant role in policy discussions on transfers to the low-income population
and to single mothers in particular. Lerman and Sorensen (forthcoming)
note that the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) system, thegovernmen-
tal program aimed at enforcing private child support obligations, iscon-
centrated on the low-income population. In their chapter, Lerman and
Sorensen review the structure of the present system and the research
that has been conducted on it.
The CSE program was established by Congress in 1975 to provide
matching funds to states to collect child-support obligations, establish
paternity, and obtain support awards. States were required to provide
child-support enforcement services to AFDC recipients and toany non-
AFDC family that requested them. The statute also required that AFDC
recipients assign their child-support rights to the statethat is, thatany
child support payments they received be taken by the state and usedto
compensate for the AFDC benefitand to cooperate in establishingpa-
ternity and securing support. Thus reducing welfare costs and increas-
ing child support were both goals of the system, goals that havere-
mained to the current time.
Through legislation, Congress has steadily increasedpressure on the
states to strengthen the child-support enforcement system in manyways
since 1975. In 1988 it set numerical goals for the states to establish pater-
nity for children, and later required that states establish voluntary pater-
nity acknowledgement procedures in hospitals. In 1984 and again in
1988, Congress increased pressure on states to require judges to adhere
to state child-support guidelines governing the setting of child-support
awards, which are generally tied to the income of the noncustodialpar-
ent. This was aimed at preventing judges from setting child-support
awards that were too low. Over the 1980s, Congress also increasedre-
quirements on states to use wage withholding to obtain payments from
non-custodial parents, and in 1996 went further by requiring thatevery
new hire be reported to the CSE agency in order to locate such non-
custodial parents who were delinquent in their payments and hadnot
been locatable by the agency.
The fraction of low-income custodial mothers who receiveany child
support at all was only 24 percent in 1997, and of those that receive child
support, even fewer receive the full amount that has been awarded by
the court. These low figures, despite the years of increased stringency of
child-support enforcement, attest to the difficulty of the problem. The
fraction receiving any support is, however, larger than itwas twenty
years ago, when it was only 17 percent. The increase has arisen from a
greater percentage of poor custodial mothers who actually havean
award, which is no doubt partly a result of governmental effortsat32Moffitt
establishing paternity and encouraging awards. The increase would
have been larger had it not been for a decline in the fraction ofmothers
who actually received anything even if they had an award. Part of the
reason for this decline, though notall, has been a shift in the composi-
tion of poor custodial mothers from those who are divorced orseparated
to those who have never been married; the latterhave always received
less support than the former. The fraction of single mothers onAFDC
receiving child support is approximately 17 percent, even lowerthan
that of all poor custodial mothers.
Research on child-support issues has had several purposes. One is
determining the incomes of poor noncustodial fathers in order todeter-
mine how much they are capable of paying. This is adifficult task,
because there is no ready data set to identify noncustodial fathersand
their incomes, so most estimation is indirect. Estimates indicatethat,
overall, noncustodials fathers could pay 3 to 4 times more than they are
actually paying, given their incomes and given customary guidelinesfor
how child-support awards are based on income. However, no estimates
are available for low-income fathersalone. Evidence from ethnographic
studies indicates that poor noncustodial fathers have high ratesof
nonemployment, low levels of education, little work experience,and
poor health, and often havecriminal histories and unstable housing
arrangements.
Another area of research focuses on the effect of child-supportcollec-
tions on AFDC participation and on the work effort of welfaremothers.
Because states collect most of the child support received by women on
AFDC, an increase in child support paid by the noncustodial fatherhas
no impact on a woman's income while onwelfare, but it increases in-
come off welfare. This should therefore decreaseAFDC participation
and increase the labor supply. Although the evidence is not as strong as
it could be, it does suggest that this is the case. Increasesin CSE reduce
AFDC caseloads, according to the evidence, and increases in child sup-
port reduce rates of AFDC participation and increaseemployment rates.
However, there is also some evidence that increases in child support
reduce the work effort of custodial mothers not on AFDC, for in this case
the extra income allows them to reduce their hours of work orwork
effort overall.
Research in this area suggests that, in principle, child-support pay-
ments and CSE in particular might reduce thework effort of non-
custodial fathers, as they are required to pay a percentage of their in-
come toward support. However, the littleempirical evidence available
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fathers have inelastic labor supply curves, but itmay also be because
only in a minority of cases do courts update award amountsas incomes
of fathers change. Typically, award amountsare set in relation to in-
come at the time of the initial court judgement, but no adjustments are
made thereafter. Nevertheless, ethnographic evidence doessuggest that
child-support enforcement tends to drive many men into the under-
ground economy, where income is not reported. Indeed, much of the
research discussion of the incentives faced by noncustodial fathers fo-
cuses on the lack of incentives to pay child support given the fact that all
payments go to the government instead of to the children if the mother
is on welfare. An additional problem is that manymen have accumu-
lated large amounts of child-support debt, whichare very difficult to
work off.
Attention has also been paid to the effects of child-supportpayments
on marriage, divorce, remarriage, and nonmarital childbearing. The pre-
dictions of the effect are in most cases ambiguous, because, whilein-
creased child support gives men an incentive not tomarry, remarry, or
have children out of wedlock, it increases the custodial mother's incen-
tives in the other direction by making single motherhood less financially
onerous. The little evidence on the issue suggests that there are indeed
effects in this direction, with child support appearing to reduceremar-
riage, nonmarital childbearing, and divorce, but their magnitudesare
uncertain.
Finally, there has been considerable researchon the effectiveness of
child-support enforcement policy itself on increasing paternity establish-
ment, award rates, and payment of child support. The evidencesug-
gests that it has had an effect, particularly on the first of these. This is
consistent with the time-series evidence mentioned earlier. Thus CSE
policy has been shown to have an effect, and for thisreason it continues
to enjoy strong support as a public policy.
11. CONCLUSIONS
Economic research on the effects of the nation's system ofmeans-tested
transfers has yielded a large volume of important findings. One of the
most basic is the repeated finding that the programs are, by and large,
attaining their central goals of increasing the consumption of low-
income families of medical care, food, housing, childcare, and other
targeted goods. Another is that there has beenan increased redirection
of support toward the disabled, both adults and children, bothfor the
receipt of cash support and for medical assistance, and towardneedy34Moffitt
children off TANF, another worthy goal. A third is thatthe EITC has
been successful in raising the employment rate of low-incomesingle
mothers, a long-sought goal of transfer policy in the U.S.
At the same time, research has demonstrated that the attainmentof
other goals of these programs is still a challenge. Designingthe transfer
programs to provide strong work incentiveswhich are acted on is still an
issue in the SSI program, for example, and the EITC has somework
disincentives for groups other than single mothers. TheAFDC-TANF
reforms have been successful in raising employment among singlemoth-
ers, but the effects on their incomes areless unambiguously positive.
The child-support system in the U.S. has made great improvementsin
support for low-income children, but too little support isstill received
by low-income mothers, yet the burden on low-incomefathers is al-
ready onerous by many accounts. Effects of all transfer programs on
family structure have become an important topic, but no programhas
been successful in making a major improvement. Designingreforms to
address these and other issues wifi continue to make this afruitful area
of research.
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